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ELIMINATION OF THE OSWIN V. SHAW SERIOUS LIFE
IMPACT REQUIREMENT: A SERIOUS IMPACT ON THE
FUTURE OF NEW JERSEY’S NO-FAULT
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
Holly R. Blanchard ∗
I.

INTRODUCTION

Catherine Norris was involved in a car accident, rear-ended by
1
Cecilia Altamar on December 4, 2001. As a result, Ms. Norris suffered a small disc herniation in her lower vertebrae, causing her to
2
experience back pain and occasional numbness in her right leg.
While she was compensated for specific damages through the standard automobile insurance claims process, she sought to bring suit
for the recovery of non-economic damages she had suffered as a re3
sult of her injuries.
However, when Ms. Norris purchased her no-fault automobile
4
5
insurance policy, she selected the verbal threshold tort option. Ms.
∗
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1
Norris v. Altamar, No. L-117-03, 2005 WL 2585469, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. Oct. 14, 2005).
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
"No-fault insurance" describes an automobile insurance scheme that requires
all drivers to carry insurance providing coverage up to policy limits for their own
damages, regardless of who is at fault in an accident. In addition, no-fault insurance
places restrictions on the policyholders’ ability to sue other drivers for non-economic
damages. A “pure” no-fault system would completely bar policyholders from suing
other drivers for damages. However, no state uses a pure system. Instead, states that
implement a no-fault scheme use a combination of the no-fault system and standard
liability insurance, called “real” no-fault insurance. See generally KENNETH S. ABRAHAM,
INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 724–29 (4th ed., Foundation
Press 2005) (presenting a basic yet comprehensive overview of the underpinnings
and development of no-fault automobile insurance).
5
Id.
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Norris enjoyed lower premiums as a result of her selection, but the
quid pro quo was the restriction on her ability to sue for non-economic
6
damages arising from injuries sustained in an automobile accident.
The New Jersey statute governing the verbal threshold option allows
only those people to bring suit whose injuries fall under one of the
7
statutorily defined categories of injury. Additionally, at the time of
Ms. Norris’s claim and for nine years prior, judicial interpretation of
the same statute had imposed an additional requirement on prospective plaintiffs—the injury must also have a serious impact on the
8
plaintiff and her life. At trial, Ms. Norris failed to show that her noneconomic injuries had a serious impact on her life, despite being
permanent in nature; as a result, her case was dismissed on summary
9
judgment.
Ms. Norris appealed the trial judge’s decision, and while her appeal was pending, the New Jersey Supreme Court handed down a de10
cision in DiProspero v. Penn rendering the serious life impact requirement null and void in suits for non-economic damages, such as
11
those claimed by Ms. Norris. Her case can now proceed at trial, and
given that she has already established the permanent nature of her
injuries and no longer has to demonstrate a serious life impact, she
will likely withstand the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
This is just one example of many appeals on New Jersey’s dock12
ets currently awaiting the retroactive application of DiProspero.
DiProspero has opened the door to appeals and new suits similar to
13
that of Ms. Norris. Presently, automobile accident victims who have
6

Id.
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-8(a) (West 2002).
8
See Oswin v. Shaw, 609 A.2d 415 (N.J. 1992).
9
Norris v. Altamar, No. L-117-03, 2005 WL 2585469, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. Oct. 14, 2005).
10
874 A.2d 1039 (N.J. 2005).
11
See id.
12
The decision in DiProspero has been granted “pipeline” retroactivity for appeals.
See Beltran v. DeLima, 877 A.2d 307, 310 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005).
7

13
See, e.g., Fithen v. Johnson, No. L-1353-03, 2005 WL 3299165 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Dec. 7, 2005); Klitsch v. Gilbert, No. BUR-L-3643-02, 2005 WL
3242322 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Dec. 2, 2005); Sandrow v. Mastrullo, No. L3307-02, 2005 WL 3196574 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Nov. 30, 2005); Mattia v.
Capone, No. ESX-L-10932-02, 2005 WL 3158058 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Nov.
29, 2005); Rodriguez v. Hopewell, No. L-3864-02, 2005 WL 3115819 (N.J.
Super. App. Div. Nov. 23, 2005), Davis v. Gaspari, No. L-1688-03, 2005 WL
3071576 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Nov. 17, 2005), Immordino v. Romano, No.
MER-L-3338-02, 2005 WL 3050612 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Nov. 16, 2005),
Carroll v. Buchanan, No. L-2106-03, 2005 WL 3040770 (N.J. Super. App. Div.
Nov. 15, 2005), Youssef v. Procopio, No. L-4112-03, 2005 WL 2923570 (N.J.
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selected the verbal threshold tort option in their no-fault automobile
insurance policies can bring suit for pain and suffering under a sig14
nificantly less stringent standard. According to the insurance industry, requiring only that plaintiffs sustain a permanent injury, and not
an injury that has a serious impact on their lives, leads to a substantial
increase in automobile insurance premiums for policyholders selecting this option because the price of litigation and likely settlement
costs will be passed on to consumers in the form of higher premi15
ums.
Previously, Ms. Norris’s claim would have been dismissed on
summary judgment because of the New Jersey Supreme Court’s 1992
16
decision in Oswin v. Shaw. In Oswin, the court held that for plaintiffs selecting the verbal threshold in their no-fault automobile insurance policy to sue for pain and suffering, they must demonstrate not
only that their injuries fit into one of the nine statutorily defined
categories of injury, but also that the injury alleged had a “serious
17
impact on the plaintiff and her life.” Oswin dealt with the interpretation of the statute introducing the verbal threshold to New Jersey
18
insurance law (“the 1988 Act”). The 1988 Act allowed policyholders
a choice of either the verbal threshold tort option or a no threshold
option; the latter was available for a much higher premium, but in return gave the policyholder the opportunity to sue for non-economic
damages arising from any injury, and not just those defined in the
19
statute. Plaintiffs who selected the verbal threshold option enjoyed
Super. App. Div. Nov. 7, 2005), Harrison v. Lora, No. L-1139-02, 2005 WL
2848184 (N.J. Super. App. Div. Nov. 1, 2005).
14

See discussion infra Part VI.
See Industry Fears 'Serious Impact' on Auto Market of N.J. Court Ruling, INSURANCE
JOURNAL, July 4, 2005, http://www.insurancejournal.com/magazines/east/
2005/07/04/features/57616.htm. According to Pinnacle Actuarial Resources, an
actuarial consulting firm serving the automobile insurance industry, the increases in
bodily injury, uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage costs that might result
from the decision in DiProspero for drivers selecting the verbal threshold option in
their no-fault insurance policies are between thirty-four and fifty-seven percent, or
“approximately $98 to $163 annually per car.” Id. New Jersey is already in a particularly perilous situation for rate increases, given that the average expenditure for private passenger automobile insurance has consistently been the highest in the nation.
Historically, New Jersey has paid up to four times the national average in dividends to
policyholders, and at times that figure has reached six times the national average. See
Insurance Information Institute: Facts and Statistics, http://www.iii.org/media/
facts/statsbyissue/auto. (last visited September 9, 2006).
16
609 A.2d 415 (N.J. 1992).
17
Oswin v. Shaw, 595 A.2d 522, 527 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
18
Id. at 523.
19
See CYNTHIA M. CRAIG & DANIEL J. POMEROY, NEW JERSEY AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
LAW 13 (Gann Law Books 2004) (1998). This was the first time that the more restric15
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significantly lower premiums, but were restricted in their right to sue
for general damages; in order to bring suit, they had to show that
their injuries fell within one of the nine statutorily defined catego20
ries. In reaching its decision, the court relied on the legislature’s
intent to “close[] the courthouse door to all lawsuits except those involving bona fide serious injuries . . . [and] maintain[] the substantial
21
benefits of no-fault [insurance] at an affordable price.”
22
The New Jersey Supreme Court in DiProspero significantly al23
tered the requirements to bring suit. Now, appeals and claims for
non-economic damages like Ms. Norris’s would survive a motion for
summary judgment and proceed to trial. In DiProspero, the court considered whether the “serious life impact” standard set in Oswin carried forward to claims brought following the passage in 1998 of the
Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act (AICRA) which amended
24
the 1988 Act. The court held that Oswin’s “serious life impact” stantive tort option became the default option. Prior to the passage of the 1988 Act, a
policyholder who did not elect otherwise became subject to the $200 monetary
threshold, instead of the $1500 threshold, which offered lower premiums. Id. Following the passage of the 1988 Act, “all insureds were made subject to the verbal
threshold unless they affirmatively elected otherwise on a coverage selection form.”
Id.
20
See 1988 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 119 (West) (current version at N.J. STAT. Ann. §
39:6A-8(a) (2003)):
Tort exemption; limitation on the right to noneconomic loss:
Every owner, registrant, operator or occupant of an automobile to
which . . . personal injury protection coverage, regardless of fault, applies . . . is hereby exempted from tort liability for noneconomic loss to
a person who is subject to this subsection . . . unless that person has
sustained a personal injury which results in death; dismemberment; significant disfigurement; a fracture; loss of a fetus; permanent loss of use of a body organ, member, function or system; permanent consequential limitation of use of a
body organ or member; significant limitation of use of a body function or system;
or a medically determined injury or impairment of a non-permanent nature
which prevents the injured person from performing substantially all of the material acts which constitute that person's usual and customary daily activities for
not less than 90 days during the 180 days immediately following the occurrence
of the injury or impairment.
Id. (emphasis added).
21
Oswin, 595 A.2d at 524 (citing Governor’s Reconsideration and Recommendation Statement to Senate, No. 2637-L.1998. c. 119, see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:28-1.4).
22
DiProspero v. Penn, 874 A.2d 1039 (N.J. 2005).
23
See discussion infra Part V.
24
DiProspero, 874 A.2d at 1047–49. The court had previously denied certification
on this issue. See James v. Torres, 808 A.2d 873 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002), cert.
denied, 816 A.2d 1049 (N.J. 2003).
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25

dard did not survive AICRA. The court argued, among other reasons, that AICRA represented a complete overhaul of New Jersey’s
automobile insurance statute and therefore Oswin’s interpretation is
26
Following DiProspero, for plaintiffs to
not applicable to AICRA.
bring suit for non-economic damages under the verbal threshold
27
(now termed the “limitation on lawsuit”) option, they must demonstrate only that their injuries fit into one of the six statutorily defined
28
categories, rendering irrelevant in verbal threshold cases the impact
on damage calculations, if any, that the injury had on the plaintiff’s
life.
Had the proverbial slate upon which AICRA was drafted been
wiped clean at the time of its creation, it would indeed be difficult to
argue that the “serious life impact” prong had survived the amendments to the 1988 Act. However, AICRA was not written upon a
blank slate. This Comment will argue that under an examination of
the strong legislative intent powering the evolution of New Jersey
automobile insurance law to its present form, the precedential value
of the Oswin decision, the reasoning of cases heard prior to DiProspero
in the New Jersey Appellate Division supporting the “serious life impact” prong, and AICRA’s shortcomings, it is clear that the DiProspero
court was incorrect in rejecting Oswin’s “serious life impact” require-

25

See discussion infra Part V.
DiProspero, 874 A.2d at 1046.
27
While now officially termed the “limitation on lawsuit” option (see N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 39:6A-8(1)), it is popularly referred to in practice by its old name, the “verbal
threshold.” CRAIG & POMEROY, supra note 19, at 13. The verbal threshold is called
that because the subsection of the statute in which it is found is intended to define
the nature of the injury that a plaintiff must suffer in order to bring suit. Essentially,
the plaintiff’s injuries must fall under one of the statutory definitions. See N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 39:6A-8(1) (West 2005).
28
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-8(1) (West 2005):
26

Tort exemption; limitation on the right to noneconomic loss:
Every owner, registrant, operator or occupant of an automobile to
which . . . personal injury protection . . . regardless of fault, applies . . .
is hereby exempted from tort liability for noneconomic loss to a person
who is subject to this subsection . . . unless that person has sustained a
bodily injury which results in death; dismemberment; significant disfigurement or significant scarring; displaced fractures; loss of a fetus; or a permanent
injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability, other than scarring or
disfigurement. An injury shall be considered permanent when the body
part or organ, or both, has not healed to function normally and will
not heal to function normally with further medical treatment.
Id. (emphasis added).
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29

ment. Ultimately, while AICRA did amend the 1988 Act, the thrust
behind the 1988 Act had remained in place up to and beyond the
time of AICRA’s passage; thus, refusing to carry forth the Oswin standard would not only be bad policy, but it would ignore the legislative
intent behind AICRA and its predecessors.
This Comment begins with a presentation of the history of New
Jersey automobile insurance statutes. It will introduce the lengthy yet
important history to highlight the Legislature’s continuing intent to
draft a law allowing for recovery of a plaintiff’s losses while maintaining reasonable no-fault premiums. Part II will also discuss the development of the verbal threshold, the underlying topic of this paper.
Part III of the Comment will provide an analysis of the New Jersey
Supreme Court’s decision in Oswin v. Shaw, the case which interpreted AICRA’s predecessor to include a “serious life impact” requirement. Part IV introduces and provides a detailed explanation of
AICRA, and offers a comparison to its predecessor, the 1988 Act.
Part V presents the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in DiProspero
v. Penn, which eliminated the earlier “serious life impact” requirement imposed in Oswin. Part VI rebuts the court’s decision in DiProspero and argues that Oswin’s “serious life impact” standard should be
retained based on the role of legislative intent in the creation of
AICRA, prior judicial construction of issue, and a critical examination
of AICRA.
II. HISTORY OF NEW JERSEY AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE STATUTES
New Jersey’s history with automobile insurance legislation highlights the state’s ongoing attempts to balance the policyholder’s right
to recover for losses incurred as a result of bodily injury against main30
taining reasonable and affordable premiums. In 1972, the Legisla29

Recently proposed amendments, which move to instate the Oswin “serious life
impact” requirement for suits brought post-AICRA, left the issue for the Legislature
to clarify for the courts the meaning and correct interpretation of this statute. See,
e.g., Assemb. B. 4381, 211th Leg. (N.J. 2004); Assemb. B. 4227, 211th Leg. (N.J.
2004); S.B. 2688, 211th Leg. (N.J. 2004); S.B. 2705, 211th Leg. (N.J. 2004); available
at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/bills/BillsByNumber.asp (last visited Sept. 15, 2006).
30
Prior to 1929, no legislation in New Jersey had been written to address the financial responsibilities of drivers in automobile accidents causing either bodily injury
or property damage. CRAIG & POMEROY, supra note 19, at 2. Between 1929 and 1952,
only those individuals who had committed certain specified offenses had to prove
that they had the financial ability to respond to any claim for either injury or property damage in an accident. Id. With the passage of the Motor Vehicle SecurityResponsibility Law of 1952, New Jersey expanded the number of people who had to
demonstrate proof of financial ability to respond to claims by injured parties. Id. at
3. Specifically, it required any person involved in an accident resulting in $100 or
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ture adopted the New Jersey Automobile Reparation Reform Act,
31
known in short as the “No Fault Act,” which signified the switch to
compulsory no-fault insurance from a voluntary insurance scheme for
personal injury protection (“PIP”) benefits for all drivers registered in
32
the state of New Jersey. The effect was that “all insurance policies
written for private passenger vehicles were required to provide enumerated personal injury protection benefits to certain classes of per33
sons without regard to who was at fault in the accident.” PIP benefits
included medical-expense benefits, income continuation benefits, essential-services benefits, death benefits, and funeral expenses benefits
payable to an insured and members of the insured’s family who sustained bodily injury or death as a result of an automobile accident,
34
without regard to the fault of the insured. While the default option
was the limitation on lawsuit option, drivers were ultimately given an
option to remain with the default choice or to retain their right to
35
The No Fault Act implemented a monetary
sue for any injury.
threshold, in contrast to a verbal threshold, of $200 for the recovery
of non-economic loss for bodily injury and resultant medical ex36
penses. The monetary threshold meant that plaintiffs would only be
able to bring suit for non-economic damages if it was proven that
37
their medical expenses had exceeded $200.
more in damages to post a security fixed by the Department of Motor Vehicles unless
that person had separate liability insurance. Id. New Jersey had a voluntary insurance scheme in place until 1972; however, it shifted to a compulsory no-fault insurance scheme in 1972 when it became clear that a voluntary insurance scheme failed
to provide adequate protection to automobile accident victims. Id. at 10. Similarly,
the voluntary scheme imposed an enormous financial burden on the state through
the number of claims being made through the Uncompensated Claim and Judgment
Fund, which provided a measure of relief to persons sustaining losses in automobile
accidents caused by uninsured or financially unstable motorists. Id.
31
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-1 to -18 (effective Jan. 1. 1973).
32
CRAIG & POMEROY, supra note 19, at 10. The Act also made uninsured motorist
coverage mandatory. Id. Additionally, the No Fault Act implemented protective
measures in hopes of containing rising rates which had been shown in part to result
from fraudulent claims; for example, penalties were assessed to persons making false
or fraudulent claims. Id. at 9.
33
Id. (emphasis added).
34
N.J. Coal. of Health Care Prof’ls, Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t of Banking and Ins., 732
A.2d 1063, 1068 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
35
CRAIG & POMEROY, supra note 19, at 203.
36
Id. at 202.
37
“The section barred civil suits for damages ‘if the bodily injury is confined
solely to the soft tissue of the body and if the medical expenses incurred or to be incurred by such injured person for the reasonable and necessary treatment of such
bodily injury, is, less than $200.00, exclusive of hospital expenses, x-rays, and other
diagnostic medical expenses.’” CYNTHIA M. CRAIG & DANIEL J. POMEROY, NEW JERSEY
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE LAW 242 (Gann Law Books 2004) (2004).
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In another effort to lower the rising costs of PIP premiums, the
Legislature amended the No Fault Act in 1983 with the New Jersey
Automobile Insurance Freedom of Choice and Cost Containment
Act, providing policyholders the option to elect a higher monetary
threshold of $1500 instead of the previous $200 threshold in return
38
for lower premiums. The $200 amount remained the default policy
39
selection. The increase in the monetary threshold was a response to
the scenario that had become all too common to the courts: “[E]very
torts lawyer in the state[] soon recognized that it would be easy to inflate damages above the $200 threshold level—and hence to enable a
40
torts suit—by increasing the cost of medical treatments.” However, even
the $1,500 threshold did not prove to be a barrier to suits as claimants found it nearly as easy to circumvent the $1500 threshold as they
did the $200 threshold. Between 1980 and 1988, the “severity” of
claims had doubled: claims for bodily injury had risen from $7592 to
41
$14,484, easily enabling a plaintiff to vault the threshold, either artificially or legitimately, and bring suit.
In 1988, the Legislature replaced the monetary threshold with a
verbal threshold in response to the ease of manipulation of the
42
monetary threshold. This reformulation of the tort threshold was a
direct response to the shortcomings of prior law. “The statute was a
pragmatic accommodation provoked by the spiraling costs and decreasing availability of automobile insurance, congestion in the
courts, and the conviction of many that the judicial system should not
43
give audience to minor automobile injury claims.”
The verbal
threshold is intended to define the nature of the injury that a plain38

Id. at 42.
See supra note 19 (explaining that $200 was the default policy selection).
40
See Howard M. Latin, No Fault: To Be or Not To Be? When Drivers Sue Drivers: Exposing the Myths Underlying Automobile Litigation, 166 N.J. LAW. Jan. 1995 at 24 (emphasis added). See also John D. Worrall, Private Passenger Auto Insurance in New Jersey: A
Three-Decade Advertisement for Reform, in DEREGULATING PROPERTY-LIABILITY INSURANCE:
RESTORING COMPETITION AND INCREASING MARKET EFFICIENCY 106 (J. David Cummins
ed., 2002) (noting “[i]t was a simple matter to exceed the [$200] lawsuit threshold”).
The 1972 Act’s $200 threshold had been eroded by the inflation of the price of
medical services so as to reduce it to $77.62 in real figures. Id. The Legislature, in
implementing the $1,500 threshold found that the numbers of suits were not being
reduced as it had hoped; the $200 threshold had failed because the amount was simply too little when considered in light of medical expenses even without their artificial inflation. Id.
41
See Worrall, supra note 40, at 110. By 1988, because the costs of medical care
had been continuously inflated, the $200 monetary threshold originally introduced
in 1972 had been whittled down to only $56 by 1983. Id.
42
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-8, 8.1 (effective Jan. 1, 1989).
43
Oswin v. Shaw, 595 A.2d 522, 523 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
39
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tiff must suffer, instead of the amount of medical bills incurred, in
44
order to maintain a suit for non-economic loss. Thus, the more restrictive tort option became the default tort option, applicable to all
policyholders except those who elected otherwise, unlike the 1983
45
Act which set the less restrictive $200 threshold as the default. Similar, however, to the earlier version of the Act, policyholders still retained the option to select a zero-threshold policy that, while having
much higher premiums, allowed the insured to retain the right to sue
46
for non-economic loss resulting from any injury.
III. OSWIN V. SHAW: THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT’S
INTERPRETATION OF THE 1988 ACT
The New Jersey Supreme Court in Oswin faced the issue of
whether plaintiff’s injuries were sufficient to vault the 1988 version of
the verbal threshold and thus maintain a suit for non-permanent in47
juries. Plaintiff’s injuries were alleged to fall under either category
seven (“permanent consequential limitation of use of a body organ or
member”) or category eight (“significant limitation of use of a body
48
function or system”). The New Jersey Appellate Division, later affirmed by the New Jersey Supreme Court, concluded that the test for
whether a plaintiff’s injuries have vaulted the verbal threshold did not
depend merely on the plaintiff’s treating physician’s assertions that
the injuries suffered fit within one of the categories; instead, the
court stated that the real test is “whether the injury has a serious im49
pact on the plaintiff and her life.”

44

See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
46
The verbal threshold option has been by far the most popular choice among
policyholders in New Jersey. Approximately three years after it was introduced, “85%
of the population ha[d] opted for the lower cost ‘verbal threshold’ over the higher
cost ‘no threshold’ option.” Oswin, 595 A.2d at 524. But see Worrall, supra note 40, at
104 (highlighting that while no-fault is the most popular option in New Jersey, selected by nearly ninety percent of the insureds in the state, this “popularity” may just
be a framing effect because no-fault is the default choice for policyholders in the
state).
47
Oswin v. Shaw, 609 A.2d 415, 416 (N.J. 1992).
48
Id. at 427.
49
Oswin v. Shaw, 595 A.2d. 522, 527 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991), aff’d 609
A.2d 415 (N.J. 1992). The New Jersey Supreme Court later declared that a “[significant] limitation of use of a body function or system should be construed to mean
something more than a minor limitation of use. We believe that a minor, mild, or
slight limitation of use should be classified as insignificant within the meaning of the
statute.” Oswin, 609 A.2d at 428 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Licari v. Elliot, 441 N.E.2d 1088, 1091 (N.Y. 1982)).
45
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In arriving at the “serious life impact” requirement, the New Jersey Appellate Division ultimately looked to the interpretation of New
York’s similar no-fault automobile insurance statute for guidance,
noting that the New Jersey Legislature specifically and expressly in50
tended the 1988 Act to be patterned after the New York state law.
The Governor’s Reconsideration and Recommendation Statement
issued prior to the production of the 1988 Act’s final version provided the court with “strong evidence of [the] legislative intent” not
only behind the switch to a verbal threshold over a monetary threshold, but also behind the objective to construe the New Jersey statute
in a manner consistent with the current interpretation of the New
51
Regarding the switch from a monetary to a verbal
York statute.
threshold, then Governor Kean stated:
[The better] compromise is to make the verbal threshold the basic liability coverage in every automobile insurance policy the law
of the land in New Jersey [while allowing] . . . individual insureds
. . . to opt for a monetary threshold, at a higher cost . . . . I recommend adoption of a zero dollar threshold option [that] will allow individuals to opt into a pure fault liability system, a choice
which will be reflected in their higher premiums. The purpose of
the zero dollar [verbal threshold] option is to remove the incentive to inflate medical bills—thereby placing an unnecessary burden on PIP coverage—in order to reach some specified monetary
threshold. I believe the citizens of New Jersey recognize that
when their medical bills are being promptly paid, without regard
to fault, they lose next to nothing in relinquishing the ability to
sue for pain and suffering for nonserious injuries only and, consequently, the vast majority will maintain the base verbal thresh52
old.

Concerning the similarities between New Jersey’s proposed law
and New York’s current law, the Reconsideration and Recommendation Statement expressly stated:
The verbal threshold contained in this recommendation is patterned after that in force in New York State. [New York’s] verbal
threshold specifically sets forth those injuries which will be considered “serious.” Lawsuits for non-economic injuries, such as
pain and suffering, will be allowed for these enumerated “serious
injuries” only. It is my intention that the term “serious injury,” as
defined in this recommendation, shall be construed in a manner
that is consistent with the New York Court of Appeals’ decision in
50
51
52

Oswin, 595 A.2d at 524.
Id.
Id. at 523–24.
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Licari v. Elliot. Whether a plaintiff has sustained a “serious injury”
must be decided by the court, and not the jury. Otherwise, the
bill’s essential purpose of closing the courthouse door to all lawsuits except
those involving bona fide serious injuries will be diluted and the bill’s
effectiveness will be greatly diminished. In addition, strict construction of the verbal threshold is essential; any judicial relaxation of this plain language will impede the intent of maintaining
53
the substantial benefits of no-fault at an affordable price.

Based on this statement of the Legislature’s goal to keep no-fault
insurance premiums affordable, the court followed the language present in the Governor’s Recommendation, concluding that the 1998
Act was to be construed in a manner that only permitted plaintiffs
54
with a “serious” injury to sue. Applying this reasoning to plaintiff’s
case, the court cited the Licari decision in support of the proposition
that a significant “‘limitation of use of a body function or system’
should be construed to mean something more than a minor limita53

Oswin, 595 A.2d at 524 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The Licari decision’s summarization of the legislative intent behind the changes to the New York
no-fault scheme mirrors the intent behind the changes made in New Jersey; essentially, New York plaintiffs were similarly padding their medical bills in order to vault
the monetary threshold, and the Legislature responded with the implementation of
the verbal threshold. See generally Licari, 441 N.E.2d 1088. This was not the only motive behind the switch to a verbal threshold in New York; like New Jersey, New York’s
verbal threshold was intended to keep suits for minor, non-serious injuries out of the
courts, not only to reduce congestion in the courts, but also to further the goal of
keeping no-fault automobile insurance premiums affordable. Id.
54
The Supreme Court in Oswin recognized that its test might pose some problems in its application:
We understand that one might view the “serious impact on plaintiff's
life” test as somewhat subjective. To ensure uniform application of that
test, we emphasize that plaintiffs must submit objective, credible evidence that could support a jury finding in his or her favor. We respect
the abilities of medical professionals to ascertain the presence of a
genuine, disabling injury, but we nevertheless are satisfied that the Legislature sought to guard against a finding of “serious injury” when
plaintiff's proofs are based solely on subjective complaints of pain.
Oswin v. Shaw, 609 A.2d 415, 429 (N.J. 1992) (emphasis omitted).
The “objective medical evidence” requirement was one part of a three-part requirement for a plaintiff’s injuries to vault the threshold under the sixth, seventh,
and eight categories of injury. See Thomas P. Weidner & Michael J. Canavan, The
“New” Verbal Threshold: But is it Improved?, 24 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 117, 123 (1999).
The other two requirements were (1) “plaintiff must show a nexus between the injury
and the disability,” and (2) plaintiff must show a serious life impact. Id. (quoting
Oswin, 609 A.2d at 429). This flows from the Oswin court adopting what has been
deemed as the “summary judgment plus” standard: essentially, the “question of
whether an injury is ‘serious’ is a matter for the court to decide, but disputes regarding the nature and extent of the injury will survive summary judgment only if the
plaintiff has submitted objective medical evidence to support his or her claims.” Id.
at 122 (emphasis omitted) (citing Oswin, 609 A.2d at 422).
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tion of use. We believe that a minor, mild or slight limitation of use
should be classified as insignificant within the meaning of the stat55
ute.” Because the plaintiff had failed to show that her injuries were
more than a mild limitation on use, her claim was dismissed on sum56
mary judgment.
IV. THE AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COST REDUCTION ACT
57

The Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act (AICRA), New
Jersey’s most recent alteration to its no-fault insurance scheme, was
58
enacted in 1998. AICRA was enacted “in order to further limit the
number of lawsuits filed and thereby reduce premiums for bodily in59
jury coverage.” From the time of the passage of the 1988 Act until
the passage of AICRA, New Jersey had consistently paid the highest or
near-highest average automobile insurance premiums in the coun60
try. AICRA contained numerous provisions aimed at reducing the
cost of insurance, some with the purpose of addressing the failure of
the 1988 Act to “stem the tide of lawsuits related to soft tissue inju61
ries,” and others hoping to contain the severity of claims that were
55

Oswin, 609 A.2d at 428 (quoting Licari, 441 N.E.2d at 1091).
Oswin, 595 A.2d at 528.
57
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-8 (Supp. 2006).
58
The need for automobile insurance reform was a prominent campaign issue in
the pending gubernatorial race between incumbent Governor Christie Whitman and
her challenger, State Senator James R. McGreevey. Following Governor Whitman’s
reelection, the Senate and Assembly created a Joint Committee on Automobile Insurance Reform that held seven committee meetings and five “deliberations” between December 16, 1997 and April 2, 1998, addressing the history of the no-fault
scheme in New Jersey, current areas of the law needing reform, and culminating in
the drafting of AICRA. New Jersey State Library, Legislative History Compilations,
http://www.njstatelib.org/NJLH/LH9899/CHAP21.HTM (last visited Sept. 15,
2006).
59
Sponsor’s
Statement
to
S.B.
3,
208th
Leg.
(N.J.
1998),
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/9899/Bills/s0500/3_i2.pdf.
60
See Randy Diamond, N.J. Car Insurance Rates Again Top Nation, RECORD (Hackensack), Feb. 9, 1995 at A-3; see also supra note 15.
61
CRAIG & POMEROY, supra note 19, at 255. See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-1.1
(West 2002). The Legislature sought again to address the issue of “padding” of
plaintiffs’ medical bills; however, their efforts were directed at a slightly different
area this time. See discussion infra Part II. Their concerns regarding the verbal
threshold no longer centered around the padding of medical bills to vault a monetary threshold; instead, the focus was the rate increases resulting from extremely high
and inflated payouts for injuries and unnecessary treatment. Id.
Whereas, Since the enactment of the verbal threshold in 1988, the substantial increase in the cost of medical expense benefits indicates that
the benefits are being overutilized . . . ,thus undermining the limitations imposed by the threshold and necessitating the imposition of further controls on the use of those benefits, including the establishment
56

BLANCHARD FINAL.DOC

2006]

10/20/2006 11:59:01 AM

COMMENT

293

being artificially inflated by limiting the methods of treatment for injuries to those specifically approved by the Commissioner of Banking
62
and Insurance.
In response to the difficulty that New Jersey’s lower court had
had in interpreting the “subjective” categories of injury of the 1988
63
64
Act, and the subsequent lack of uniformity in decision making regarding injuries alleged to fall within these categories, AICRA re65
The first three
vamped the disputed categories in the 1988 Act.
categories of death, dismemberment, and loss of a fetus, were carried
66
forward without change.
The Legislature expanded the fourth
67
category, significant disfigurement, to include significant scarring.
The fifth category, fracture, was reduced in scope to now include only
68
displaced fractures. The changes made to categories six through
nine were the most substantial; all four categories were replaced and
the terms “significant” and “consequential” have been substituted by
69
the single qualifier of “permanent.” The final qualifying category of
of a basis for determining whether treatments or diagnostic tests are
medically necessary.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-1.1(b).
62
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-1.1. The Commissioner adopted N.J. ADMIN. CODE.
11:3-4, which established the standard medical procedures and protocols, and provided a list of certain acceptable and unacceptable diagnostic tests. See N.J. ADMIN.
CODE. 11:3-4 (Supp. 2005).
Specifically, N.J. ADMIN. CODE. 11:3-4.6 establishes medical protocols by
reference to six care paths which establish standard courses of appropriate treatment, including the administration of diagnostic tests, for
identified injuries stemming from trauma to the neck and back. The
care paths are not applicable to generally more serious injuries such as
dismemberment, scarring, fractures, or head and organ injury. As
noted, these care paths apply only to generally less serious-injuries—
soft tissue injuries—which, in [the] D[epartment] O[f]
B[anking][and] I[nsurance]'s view, have driven up PIP and liability
premium costs.
N.J. Coal. of Health Care Prof’ls, Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t of Banking and Ins., 732 A.2d
1063, 1074 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
63
This refers to prior categories six through nine in the 1988 Act. See 1988 N.J.
Sess. Law Serv. 119 (West). While not numbered in the statute, they are here referred to by number for ease of reference.
64
See James v. Torres, 808 A.2d 873, 876 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) cert. denied, 816 A.2d 1049 (N.J. 2003).(“It would not be an understatement to say that it can
appear difficult to find an analytical thread unifying subsequent judicial treatment of
what constitutes a ‘serious impact’ upon a plaintiff's life.”).
65
Compare supra notes 20 with 28 (providing the text of both the 1988 Act’s and
AICRA’s versions of the categories of injury).
66
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-8 (West 2002).
67
See id.
68
See id.
69
See id.
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injury under AICRA now reads “a permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability, other than scarring or disfigure70
ment.” The statute also defines how the permanence of an injury
shall be determined: “[a]n injury shall be considered permanent
when the body part or organ, or both, has not healed to function
normally and will not heal to function normally with further medical
71
treatment.”
In sum, AICRA aimed to eliminate suits for all non-permanent
injuries (other than displaced fractures) that were previously viable
causes of action under the 1988 Act. AICRA also implemented a physician certification requirement, requiring that for a plaintiff to satisfy
the provisions of the statute, he must, within sixty days following the
date of the answer to the complaint, provide the defendant with a
certification based on objective medical evidence from his treating
72
physician. The certification is required to state, under the penalty
of perjury, that the plaintiff has suffered an injury falling under one
73
of the statutorily defined categories. Additionally, AICRA created
the Office of the Fraud Prosecutor, designed to investigate and cur74
tail fraud within the insurance industry.
V. DIPROSPERO V. PENN: THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT BIDS
FAREWELL TO OSWIN’S “SERIOUS LIFE IMPACT” REQUIREMENT
Thirteen years after Oswin and seven years after AICRA’s passage, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in DiProspero v. Penn, granted
certification on the issue of whether Oswin’s “serious life impact” requirement was intended to be carried forward to verbal threshold
75
claims for non-economic damages brought post-AICRA. In DiProspero, a verbal threshold plaintiff sought recovery for non-economic
damages arising from injuries suffered in an automobile accident
which included a restricted exercise regimen, inability to eat certain
76
hard foods, and back pain. Plaintiff’s injuries did not, however, restrict her in such a manner that she could not partake in most “nor77
mal” daily activities. The New Jersey Law Division, affirmed by the
70

See id.
See id.
72
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-8 (West 2005).
73
Id.
74
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-4 (West 2005).
75
DiProspero v. Penn, 874 A.2d 1039 (N.J. 2005). The court had previously denied certification on this issue. See supra note 24.
76
DiProspero v. Penn, No. L-7318-01, 2004 WL 439350, at *1–2 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2004).
77
Id. at *1.
71

BLANCHARD FINAL.DOC

2006]

10/20/2006 11:59:01 AM

COMMENT

295

New Jersey Appellate Division, held that plaintiff’s injuries, while sufficient to satisfy the sixth category of injury of AICRA (a permanent
injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability), were not
sufficiently serious to allow recovery because AICRA requires a plaintiff to demonstrate not only that they have suffered a permanent in78
jury, but also that the injury had a serious impact on plaintiff’s life.
79
On certification, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed.
While the New Jersey Appellate Division, which had addressed this
80
81
same issue twice before in James v. Torres and Rios v. Szivos, relied
on the previously expressed legislative intent behind AICRA to reach
their decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated that because the
language of AICRA is unambiguous and does not expressly include a
“serious life impact” requirement, there is no need to resort to any
sort of extrinsic aids, like legislative intent, to determine the correct
82
interpretation. However, the court realized that it could not “ignore the unique historical background of AICRA and the prior judicial construction of a predecessor statute—the 1988 verbal threshold”
83
in its decision. To support its holding that the Legislature did not
intend for Oswin’s “serious life impact” requirement to be carried forward to cases brought post-AICRA, the Court focused on four extrin84
sic aids to determine whether they in fact point to an interpretation
85
other than that which arises from the clear language of the statute.

78

Id. at *3.
DiProspero, 874 A.2d at 1057.
80
808 A.2d 873 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div 2002), cert. denied, 816 A.2d 1049 (N.J.
2003).
81
808 A.2d 868 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002).
82
DiProspero, 874 A.2d at 1048.
83
Id. at 1049.
84
The court also considered the significance of Governor Whitman’s conditional
veto of AICRA. Id. at 1055. The Court relied on the fact that Whitman failed to reference the “serious life impact” requirement in her conditional veto statement
which, according to the court, “strongly impl[ies] that she did not expect that
Oswin’s extra-statutory standard would apply to AICRA.” Id. at 1056. See generally
Governor Whitman’s Conditional Veto, http://www.njstatelib.org/NJLH/LH9899/
CHAP21.HTM (last visited Jan. 5, 2006).
85
DiProspero, 874 A.2d. at 1050. Specifically, the Court stated:
To overcome the presumption that the Legislature acted deliberately
by not incorporating Oswin’s serious life impact standard into AICRA,
defendants must demonstrate through extrinsic aids that the Legislature expected that this court would interpret the wholly new limitation
on lawsuit threshold in the same manner as the discarded 1988 verbal
threshold.
Id.
79
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The court first looked to basic canons of statutory construction.
Defendants had argued that although the Legislature was well aware
of the construction of the verbal threshold reached in Oswin, that
construction remained in place for nearly thirteen years without legislative action. The court rebutted that argument by stating “the Legislature is presumed to be aware of the judicial construction of its enactments, and a change in the language in a statute ordinarily implies
87
a purposeful alteration in the substance of the law.” It bolstered this
rationale by offering a “selective incorporation” argument; while
AICRA expressly incorporates one portion of the holding in Oswin,
the “objective medical evidence” requirement, it fails to include the
88
requirement of a “serious life impact.” From this, the court concluded that this sort of selective incorporation “strongly implies that
[the Legislature] consciously chose not to incorporate” the “serious
89
life impact” requirement.
Next, the court turned to the contentious debate over the meaning of AICRA’s preamble, considering whether it supports a finding
90
of intent to carry forth the “serious life impact” requirement. Three
segments of the preamble formed the basis of defendant’s argument:
Whereas, The principle underlying the philosophical basis of the
no-fault system is that of a trade-off of one benefit for another; in
this case, providing medical benefits in return for a limitation on
the right to sue for non-serious injuries; and
Whereas, While the Legislature believes that it is good public policy to provide medical benefits on a first party basis, without regard to fault, to persons injured in automobile accidents, it recognizes that in order to keep premium costs down, the cost of the
benefit must be offset by a reduction in the cost of other coverages, most notably a restriction on the right of persons who have nonpermanent or non-serious injuries to sue for pain and suffering; and
....
Whereas, To meet these goals, this legislation . . . provides for a
revised lawsuit threshold for suits for pain and suffering which will

86
87
88
89
90

Id. at 1050–51.
Id. at 1049.
Id. at 1050.
Id.
DiProspero, 874 A.2d at 1051.
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eliminate suits for injuries which are not serious or permanent, including
91
those for soft tissue injuries . . . .

The court found this purported evidence of legislative intent to be
92
“merely descriptive” of the six new categories of injury. “We cannot
find a suggestion in the statute or its history that the Legislature did
93
not regard the threshold injuries to be serious injuries. The logical
conclusion is that the Legislature created those threshold categories
94
for the purpose of denominating six classes of serious injuries.”
Third, the court considered the Sponsors’ Statement to the sen95
ate bill ratified as AICRA. In the opening section, the Statement
notes “[n]o provision in this bill is intended to repeal otherwise ap96
plicable case law.” The plaintiff and defendant offered conflicting
interpretations of this statement; the plaintiff argued that the Oswin
decision no longer falls under the category of “applicable case law”
because AICRA is a statute separate and distinct from the 1988 Act
considered in Oswin, while the defendant claimed it supported the
proposition that the Legislature intended that the bill be interpreted
97
consistent with the Oswin “serious life impact” standard. The court
summarily dismissed the importance of the statement, noting “as with
all extrinsic aids enlisted to divine legislative intent, a court must proceed with caution and exercise ‘controlled judgment’ in determining
98
the weight that should be accorded to a sponsor’s statement.” Ultimately, the court did not afford the statement much weight, and
concluded that when the sentence was viewed in conjunction with the
entire paragraph, it “as a whole makes it clear that the sponsors intended to replace the verbal threshold as it had existed at the time of
99
Oswin with a completely new threshold.”
91

Id. at 1050–51 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-1.1(b) (emphasis added)).
Id. at 1051.
93
Id. at 1052 (emphasis added).
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
DiProspero, 874 A.2d at 1052; see Sponsor’s Statement, supra note 59.
97
DiProspero, 874 A.2d at 1052–53.
98
Id. at 1052 (citing Deaney v. Linen Thread Co., 118 A.2d 28 (N.J. 1955)).
99
DiProspero, 874 A.2d at 1053 (citation omitted). The court bolstered its interpretation of the Sponsor’s Statement by offering a “completely new threshold” argument, arguing that because AICRA represents a complete overhaul of the 1988 Act
and contains several provisions not found in the 1988 Act, any construction of the
1988 Act does not apply to AICRA. Id. at 1053–54. In support, the court noted that
while the 1988 Act was clearly and indisputably based on New York automobile insurance law, “the Joint Committee on Automobile Insurance Reform that drafted the
bill that became AICRA acknowledged that the source of the limitation on lawsuit
threshold was Florida law.” Id. at 1054. To the court, this shift from a foundation in
New York law to Florida law was additional strong evidence that the Legislature, in
92
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Finally, the court confronted the issue of the legislative intent
and other policy considerations behind AICRA to determine whether
they were so strong as to point to a reading of the statute other than
100
the one gleaned from its express language. Defendants contended,
“the Legislature must have intended to retain the serious life impact
standard because one of AICRA’s paramount goals was to reduce the
cost of automobile insurance” through a reduction in the number of
101
Imposing a higher, serious life impact standard
litigated claims.
would further such a goal. While it is indisputable that reducing the
number of claims is a goal of AICRA, the court disagreed with this as102
sessment. The court urged that the limitation on lawsuit threshold
103
Doing so reveals
must be viewed in light of the statute as a whole.
that AICRA is a detailed and comprehensive as well as multi-pronged

the passage of AICRA, intended to distance itself from the interpretation of the 1988
Act. Id.
However, from a reading of the entire Committee Report, it is clear that while
the language of AICRA, namely the categories of injury, are similar to Florida’s (see
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.737(2)), the Report does not offer much evidence that they
intended AICRA’s interpretation to be analogous to Florida law, which shows no serious life impact requirement. In fact, the word “Florida” is only mentioned five times
in the thirty-four page transcript of the meeting to which the court cites. The most
relevant excerpt from the Committee Report demonstrates this:
SENATOR CODEY: Jack, this essentially is the Florida language with
teeth behind it in terms of criminal penalties, in terms of perjury or falsification of the—
SPEAKER COLLINS: Yes. Yes. Using the Florida language as a base
and also coming up with [sic] trying to tinker with some of the problems that have been shown down there and then putting real teeth into
it, I think this is good, solid language that meets really what we were after, contracts the frivolous lawsuits — at least we believe it will — but
also allows real cases to go forward and has a savings into [sic] it.
See Committee Meeting of the Joint Committee on Automobile Insurance Reform,
Deliberations with Regard to Automobile Insurance Reform, March 30, 1998,
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/legislativepub/pubhearings1998.asp#JCIR.
On the other hand, it plainly appears that what the Committee desired to
achieve through their choice of language was to “contract [the amount of] frivolous
lawsuits,” a goal that has been present since the inception of the verbal threshold,
and is not new to AICRA. Id. Because the transcript is not dispositive as to whether
the Legislature intended the interpretation of AICRA to be modeled after Florida law,
the canon of statutory construction cited by the court (“a legislative enactment patterned after a statute of another state is ordinarily adopted with the prior constructions placed on it by the highest court of the parent jurisdiction”) is incorrectly applied in this situation. See DiProspero, 874 A.2d at 1054 (citing Oswin v. Shaw, 609 A.2d
415 (N.J. 1992)).
100
DiProspero, 874 A.2d at 1056.
101
Id.
102
Id. at 1056–57.
103
Id.
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approach to containing the costs of automobile insurance.
To the
court, the limitation on lawsuit threshold presented “but one means”
105
of stabilizing and reducing costs.
VI. WHY THE “SERIOUS LIFE IMPACT” LIMITATION SHOULD BE
RETAINED IN CLAIMS BROUGHT POST-AICRA
A. A Pattern of Consistent Legislative Intent
Since the inception of no-fault insurance in New Jersey in 1972,
it is clear that while the substance of the law has changed dramatically, the intent behind each of the amendments has remained the
same—to limit lawsuits brought for non-economic damages in order
106
to keep premiums both stable and affordable.
A limitation on lawsuit clause in a no-fault insurance policy, whether it is a monetary or
verbal threshold limitation, serves as a barrier to plaintiffs seeking to
107
Allowing these suits without restriction under a
bring these suits.
no-fault scheme could potentially render PIP benefits unaffordable to
many current policyholders due to the wide popularity of the limita108
tion on lawsuit option and also given that, presumably, people selecting the limitation on lawsuit option have done so because they
experience significant savings in insurance premiums from their election. The costs of litigation and the potentially high jury verdicts that
may result would be passed on to these policyholders in the form of
higher premiums, potentially eliminating their incentives for choosing the limitation on lawsuit option.
As previously explained, the Legislature has attempted to strike
this balance first through a monetary threshold, and currently
109
through the use of a verbal threshold.
While the monetary threshold had obvious shortcomings, the Legislature’s intent in its imple110
mentation did not.
Imposing a minimum threshold for the
amount of medical bills required in order to bring suit would, absent
abuse in the form of medical bill padding, limit the amount of suits
brought by allowing only those plaintiffs who have suffered medically

104

Id.
Id. at 1056.
106
See discussion supra Part II.
107
See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text (providing the statutory language and explaining the legislative intent behind the limitation on lawsuit clause).
108
See Worrall, supra note 40, at 104.
109
See discussions supra Part II and Part IV.
110
See discussion supra Part II.
105
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significant injuries to sue for pain and suffering.
However, as explained, the Legislature replaced the monetary with verbal because of
112
Adopted in response to this issue, the verbal
medical bill padding.
threshold as found in the 1988 Act and AICRA was intended to stand
as an important and significant barrier designed to limit the number
113
The difference between the 1988 Act and AICRA was the
of suits.
method of implementation of this goal—the 1988 Act switched from
a monetary to a verbal threshold, while AICRA sought to achieve
similar goals by revamping the categories of injury and tacking on
114
additional requirements for verbal threshold plaintiffs.
Furthermore, the judicial interpretation of AICRA presented in
DiProspero removes a segment of the verbal threshold barrier that has
remained in place for over a decade, the “serious life impact” re115
Through its judicial implementation, the “serious life
quirement.
impact” requirement has become a central part of verbal threshold
116
litigation.
Given the long history of inclusion of the “serious life
impact” standard and the legislative intent behind AICRA, it is reasonable that the Legislature would have “expect[ed] that [the courts]
would [have] interpret[ed] . . . [AICRA] . . . in the same manner as
117
the discarded 1988 [Act].”
This longstanding nature of Oswin’s “serious life impact” requirement raises additional questions in light of the DiProspero court’s
assertion that “the Legislature is presumed to be aware of judicial
118
Interestingly, the DiProspero court
construction of its enactments.”
offered this canon of statutory interpretation to support the opposite
conclusion—that the Legislature must not have intended to preserve
the Oswin standard when it created AICRA because presuming their
awareness of Oswin’s interpretation, it chose to expressly adopt certain aspects of former verbal threshold case law, but excluded the
119
However, the DiProspero court’s reaOswin standard from AICRA.
soning lends itself to an equally persuasive counterargument—the
Legislature, presumed to be aware of the Oswin interpretation of the
1988 Act, never objected or moved to amend the statute to specifi111

See id.
See id.
113
See N.J. STAT. ANN. 39:6A-1.1(b) (West 2002) (stating expressly in the Preamble
that AICRA is intended to limit suits for nonserious injuries).
114
See discussion supra Part II.
115
See DiProspero, 874 A.2d at 1056.
116
See discussion supra Part II.
117
DiProspero, 874 A.2d at 1050.
118
Id. at 1049.
119
See supra note 99.
112
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cally exclude a “serious life impact” requirement during the thirteen
years in which Oswin’s interpretation stood. Such “reverse” selectiveincorporation, which arguably represents Legislative acquiescence to
Oswin, holds just as much weight as DiProspero’s selective incorporation argument, yet reaches the opposite conclusion.
This continuity and clarity of legislative intent cannot be ignored; a reading of the verbal threshold standard that makes is easier
for a plaintiff to bring suit for non-economic damages runs counter
120
to the legislative purpose of AICRA and its predecessors.
Even the
Legislature itself has recognized the problems presented by the
DiProspero decision; in fact, several amendments have recently been
proposed in both the state Assembly and Senate that move to reinstate the “serious life impact” requirement in verbal threshold litiga121
In accordance with good policy, the “serious life impact”
tion.
122
standard should thus be reinstated.
B. Prior Judicial Construction of the Issue Presented in DiProspero
Earlier decisions from the New Jersey Appellate Division relied
on the weight and clarity of the legislative intent behind New Jersey’s
no-fault laws in holding that the serious life impact standard was in123
tended to be carried forward to suits brought post-AICRA.
That

120

See N.J. STAT. ANN. 39:6A-1.1(b) (West 2002) (stating expressly that AICRA is
intended to limit suits for non-serious injuries).
121
See supra note 29.
122
See 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 61 (2005) (explaining the effect of legislature's intent, objectives, and purposes in statutory interpretation):
In the interpretation of statutes, the legislative will is the all-important or
controlling factor. Indeed, it is sometimes stated in effect that the intention of the legislature constitutes the law. Accordingly, the primary rule
of construction of statutes is to ascertain and declare the intention of
the legislature, and to carry such intention into effect to the fullest degree. Thus, a construction adopted should not be such as to nullify, destroy, or defeat the intention of the legislature. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
See also 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 62 (2005) (describing the relation of general rules of
construction to determination of legislative intent):
In the interpretation of a statute, the intention of the legislature is
gathered from the provisions enacted, by the application of sound and
well-settled canons of construction. However, since all rules for the interpretation of statutes of doubtful meaning have for their sole object
the discovery of the legislative intent, every technical rule as to the construction of a statute must yield to the expression of the paramount will of the legislature. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
123
See, e.g. James v. Torres, 808 A.2d 873 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div 2002), cert. denied, 816 A.2d 1049 (N.J. 2003); Rios v. Szivos, 808 A.2d 868 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2002).
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the New Jersey Appellate Division has reached the conclusion opposite of DiProspero, combined with the New Jersey Supreme Court’s denials of certification on the issue until the year 2005, is further evi124
In James
dence that the court in DiProspero erred in its conclusion.
125
v. Torres, a plaintiff subject to the verbal threshold suffered injuries
in an automobile accident and sought recovery for her resulting non126
economic damages. The trial judge dismissed her case because her
127
injuries were not shown to have a serious impact on her life. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the Legislature did not intend to carry
forward Oswin’s “serious life impact” standard, stressing that AICRA
128
The court disagreed,
omits any mention of such a requirement.
129
emphasizing the weight to be given to the legislative purpose and
noting that plaintiff’s interpretation would undermine that purpose:
the entire thrust behind the passage of AICRA was to reduce the
number of litigated claims and, thus, to bring stability to automobile insurance premiums. If courts were to permit claims to go
forward even in the absence of proof of a serious impact on a
plaintiff’s life, it would run counter to this legislative purpose . . .
130
[because] . . . with more lawsuits comes higher costs.
131

Similarly, in Rios v. Szivos, the court concluded, mirroring the
reasoning of the New Jersey Law Division’s decision in Rogozinski v.
132
Turs, that “[b]ecause AICRA reflects an intention to ‘tighten’ the
threshold and further restrict lawsuits arising from automobile accidents,” the Legislature did not intend that AICRA dispose of the cen-

124

See James, 808 A.2d 873 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002).
Id.
126
Id. at 875.
127
Id. at 876.
128
Id.
129
“[I]n the absence of specific guidance, our task is to discern the intent of the
Legislature not only from the terms of the Act, but also from its structure, history and
purpose.” James, 808 A.2d at 878 (internal quotations omitted)(citing Jiminez v.
Baglieri, 704 A.2d 1285,1290 (N.J. 1998)). Ultimately, the court stated that “it is not
the words but the internal sense of the law that controls.” James, 808 A.2d at 878 (emphasis added)(internal quotations omitted)(citing Jiminez v. Baglieri, 704 A.2d
1285,1290 (N.J. 1998)) The court continued to define the proper sources of legislative intent—“the policy behind the statute, concepts of reasonableness and legislative
history . . . it is a general principle of statutory construction that ‘statutes are to be
read sensibly rather than literally and the controlling legislative intent is to be presumed as consonant to reason and good discretion.’” James, 808 A.2d at 879 (quoting Parker v. Esposito, 677 A.2d 1159, 1162 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996)) (citations omitted).
130
James, 808 A.2d at 878 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002).
131
808 A.2d 868 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002).
132
799 A.2d 41 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2002).
125
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133

tral holding of Oswin. Confronted with the same issue, the court in
Rogozinski specifically stated “the Legislature’s stated purpose is the
134
Even though AICRA may
key to the interpretation of any law.”
have amended the 1988 Act, the purposes had remained the same,
which to the court “d[id] not reflect an intention to modify the es135
sential holdings of Oswin.”
C. AICRA: Multi-Pronged, But Maybe Not Multi-Protective
DiProspero placed great weight on the fact that AICRA contains
several other provisions other than its version of the verbal threshold
136
aimed at containing the costs of automobile insurance.
The court
pointed to the creation of the Office of the Insurance Fraud Investigator, the implementation of the medical certification requirement,
and the “tightening” of the verbal threshold through an overhaul to
137
the categories of injury. The court concluded that the existence of
these additional protective measures eliminates the need for another
138
protective measure—the “serious life impact” standard.
Under a
closer examination, AICRA’s new measures may not be sufficiently
“protective” or effective in reducing the costs of insurance so as to
support the abandonment of the serious life impact requirement—a
hurdle to too many verbal threshold suits.
The weakest of the new “prongs” aimed at reducing the cost of
139
insurance seems to be the new threshold itself, lending further
support to the carryover of the “serious life impact” requirement. It
appears that the new threshold has not been “tightened” to the ex140
While AICRA did revamp
tent that the DiProspero court believes.
the categories of injury to eliminate suits based on non-permanent
injuries, it is possible that the number of future claims eliminated by
these changes could be negated by an increase in claims based on

133

Rios, 808 A.2d at 869 (quoting Rogozinski, 799 A.2d at 49).
Rogozinski, 799 A.2d at 48. The same issue has been considered in the New Jersey Law Division, with some cases reaching the opposite result. See, e.g., Compere v.
Collins, 799 A.2d 721 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2002) (offering a “completely new
threshold” argument and refusing to rely on extrinsic aids to determine the legislative intent because the language of AICRA is clear and unambiguous).
135
Rogozinski, 799 A.2d at 49.
136
DiProspero v. Penn, 874 A.2d 1039, 1046–47(N.J. 2005).
137
Id. at 1047.
138
Id.
139
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-8(1) (West 2005) (presenting the language of
AICRA’s verbal threshold).
140
Compare 1988 NJ Sess. Law Serv. 119 (West) with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-8(1)
(West 2002).
134
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141

permanent, non-serious injuries.
AICRA’s definition of “permanent” does not speak to the seriousness of the injury; it merely requires that the injury not heal to function normally with further
142
Previously, claims based on permanent, nonmedical treatment.
serious injuries would have been dismissed on summary judgment for
failure to vault the threshold; hence, the “new” threshold appears to
create a sort of “trade-off” by eliminating suits for non-permanent injuries and replacing them with suits for permanent, non-serious inju143
ries.
Similarly, the physician certification requirement does not appear to be a strong factor in containing the cost of insurance. This
requirement, while new in terms of language, is not new to New Jersey in practice. The court in Oswin, as part of a three-part holding,
required that the plaintiff submit objective, credible evidence to at144
test to the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s injury. Notwithstanding the absence of a clause in the statute stating that a doctor would
be subjected to penalties for fraudulent reports, those who submit
such false reports would always be subject to penalties for perjury.
The codification of this punishment cannot alone be enough to limit
the number of suits brought. This, combined with the problems presented by the new verbal threshold, create enough doubt as to the effectiveness of AICRA’s “new multi-pronged approach” to undermine
the conclusion that the Oswin “serious life impact” requirement is no
longer needed.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The New Jersey Supreme Court’s elimination of Oswin’s “serious
life impact” requirement in DiProspero v. Penn has the potential to
open the courthouse to an increased number of verbal threshold
145
While this presents an issue of concern in itself,
suits and appeals.
the decision in DiProspero is also troubling in that it runs contrary to
141

AICRA’s definition of permanent does not include a seriousness element. A
permanent, non-serious injury could be something that does not affect the daily life
of the person, but it still “permanent.” Before, this type of injury would have been
regarded as frivolous, and related suits would be disallowed. See discussion supra Part
III.
142
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-8(1) (2005).
143
See Henry Gottlieb, Lawyers Seeing Fewer Trials and Less of Each Other, NEW JERSEY
LAW JOURNAL,
Oct.
3,
2005,
available
at
http://www.law.com/jsp/
article.jsp?id=1127811911612 (noting that prior to the decision in DiProspero, the
number of cases was actually declining and highlighting the potential fallout from the
decision in terms of the number of cases on the docket and the expected increase).
144
Oswin v. Shaw, 609 A.2d 415, 429 (N.J. 1992).
145
See Gottlieb, supra note 143.
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the consistent legislative intent behind New Jersey’s latest construc146
Examintion of its no-fault automobile insurance statute, AICRA.
ing New Jersey’s history of no-fault auto insurance illustrates that a
central goal of the Legislature has consistently been to reduce the
number of suits in order to keep insurance premiums affordable—
147
whether it be through a monetary or verbal threshold limitation.
By eliminating the long-standing standard set out in Oswin, the court
in DiProspero has removed an important limitation on lawsuits, which
had remained unaltered by the Legislature for nearly thirteen
148
years.
An increase in the number of suits may have the effect of
rendering unaffordable automobile insurance premiums, contrary to
the legislative intent behind AICRA and its predecessors. While it
may be too early to feel the effects of the decision, recently proposed
149
amendments to reinstate Oswin’s requirements illustrate the growing awareness of the problems that the DiProspero decision may cause.

146
147
148
149

See discussion supra Part VI.
See id.
See discussion supra Part V.
See sources cited supra note 29 and accompanying text.

